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POLICY ANALYSIS. f o r  t h c o m i r l e  
Choice Among Pol icy  Instruments  For P o l l u t i o n  Control  
Giandomenico Majone 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied Systems Analysis ,  
Laxenburg, Aus t r i a  
Abs t rac t  
This paper d i s cus se s  a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches t o  t h e  problem of p o l l u t i o n  
c o n t r o l ,  from t h e  po in t  of view of a  c losed  model i n  whic.h r e g u l a t o r s ,  r egu la t ed ,  
and o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  groups i n t e r a c t  i n  a  s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n  s t r u c t u r e .  I t  i s  argued 
t h a t  po l icy  instruments  cannot be s e l e c t e d  only,  o r  even p r i m a r i l y ,  on t h e  b a s i s  
of t h e i r  formal p r o p e r t i e s ,  f o r  t h e s e  al low a  number of d i f f e r e n t ,  o f t e n  con- 
f l i c t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e a l i z a t i o n s .  The c r u c i a l  choices  involve  n o t  t h e  i n s t ru -  
ments themselves,  bu t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  determined ways of o p e r a t i n g  them. But t o  
d i s c u s s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  cho ice  adequately,  t h e  u sua l  model i n  which people pursue 
t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  w i th in  exogenously determined r u l e s  must be extended t o  cover 
t h e  de te rmina t ion  of t h e  r u l e s  themselves.  The comparison between, say, an un- 
co r rup ted  system of e f f l u e n t  charges ,  and r egu la to ry  machinery captured by s p e c i a l  
i n t e r e s t s  i s  then seen  t o  be a  spec ious  one. Where e f f l u e n t  charges  have been 
used, they have proved t o  be a s  s u b j e c t  t o  barga in ing  and as  condi t ioned  by 
cons ide ra t i ons  of p o l i t i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  expediency a s  s tandards ,  l i c e n s e s ,  
and o t h e r  r egu la to ry  measures. 
1. THE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE APPROACH 
Careful  ana lys i s  of r ecen t  environmental p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  
and i n  Europe r a i s e s  i s s u e s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  a c r i t i c a l  reexamination of t h e  com- 
monly accepted model of ~ u b l i c  dec i s ion  making. Although t h e  box of po l i cy  
t o o l s  has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y  enr iched  by a number of c l e v e r  techniques pro- 
posed by economists and o t h e r  po l i cy  a n a l y s t s  over t h e  l a s t  t e n  o r  f i f t e e n  
yea r s ,  l e g i s l a t o r s  and admin i s t r a to r s  show l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  new ins t ru -  
ments, and cont inue t o  r e l y  l a r g e l y  on methods ( ~ r i m a r i l y  of t h e  regula t ion len-  
forcement v a r i e t y )  whose shortcomings have been repea ted ly  pointed ou t .  
I n  t he  few ins tances  where more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t o o l s  have been used 
( l i k e  e f f l u e n t  charges i n  France and t h e  Netherlands) ,  they have supplemented, 
r a t h e r  than rep laced ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  approaches. Moreover, t h e  new ins t ru -  
ments have not  produced, so  f a r ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  had been expected on the  
b a s i s  of t h e i r  t echn ica l  p r o p e r t i e s .  Nor have they brought about t h e  pro- 
found changes i n  po l i cy  making t h a t  t h e i r  advocates had predic ted ;  t h e  in- 
j e c t i o n  of new wine i n  old i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b o t t l e s  has not  s imp l i f i ed ,  bu t  
a c t u a l l y  f u r t h e r  complicated an a l ready  confused r egu la to ry  framework. 
The disappointment  of t h e  tool-makers i s  understandable; l e s s  so  i s  
t h e i r  f a i l u r e  t o  recognize the  inadequacy of t h e  model of t h e  policy-making 
1 process  t h a t  unde r l i e s  t h e i r  proposals .  A s  Buchanan has pointed ou t  , i n  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  economic approach t h e  pub l i c  choices  t h a t  de f ine  t h e  con- 
- - 
1. James M. Buchanan, "Toward Analysis  of Closed ~ e h a v i o r a l  systems", 
i n  Buchanan, J.  M. and Tol l i son ,  R. D. e d i t o r s ,  Theory Of Publ ic  choice,  Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: Univers i ty  of Michigan Press ,  1972, pp. 11-26. 
s t r a i n t s  w i t h i n  which market behav ior  i s  allowed t o  t a k e  p l a c e ,  a r e  assumed 
t o  be  made exogenously,  by o t h e r s  t h a n  t h o s e  whose behav ior  i s  b e i n g  s t u d i e d .  
I n  s p i t e  of t h e  b e l a t e d  d i s c o v e r y  by economists of t h e  " p o l i t i c s  of r e g u l a t i o n " ,  
t h i s  assumption u n d e r l i e s  most economic a n a l y s e s  of environmental  p o l i c i e s ,  a t  
l e a s t  i n  t h e i r  more formal  a s p e c t s .  The a r t i f i c i a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  behav ior  
of i n d i v i d u a l  a c t o r s  i n  t h e  market p l a c e ,  where t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
a r e  given,  from t h e i r  behav ior  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a ,  where t h o s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  impedes s e r i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n  of environmental  p o l i c i e s ,  a t  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i v e  and a t  t h e  normat ive  l e v e l .  D e s c r i p t i v e l y ,  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount. 
of e m p i r i c a l  evidence,  some of which w i l l  b e  reviewed h e r e ,  c l e a r l y  shows t h a t  
people  pursue  t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  n o t  on ly  w i t h i n  g iven  r u l e s ,  b u t  a l s o  by in- 
v e s t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t o  change t h e  r u l e s  t o  t h e i r  own b e n e f i t .  And once t h i s  f a c t  
i s  recognized,  "normative economics e n t e r s  an  Alice-in-Wonderland world i n  which 
p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a r e  d e s i r a b l e  i n  t h e  t r u n c a t e d  model l o s e  much of t h e i r  a p p e a l .  112 
I n  t h i s  paper  I examine a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches  t o  t h e  problems of p o l l u -  
t i o n  c o n t r o l  from t h e  v iewpoin t  of a  "closed" model i n  which r e g u l a t o r s ,  re- 
g u l a t e d ,  and o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  groups  i n t e r a c t  i n  a  s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n  s t r u c t u r e .  
The model is  d e r i v e d  from t h e  " p u b l i c  choice"  o r  " i n s t i t u t i o n a l  choice"  t h e o r i e s  
developed r e c e n t l y  a s  n e c e s s a r y  complements of t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e o r y  of market 
 transaction^.^ The main o b j e c t i v e  of a  t h e o r y  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h o i c e  i s  " t o  
- - - - -- -. . . 
.. -- 
2. V i c t o r  P .  Goldberg, " I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Change And The Q u a s i - I n v i s i b l e  
Hand", The J o u r n a l  Of Law And Economics, XVII(2), October 1974, pp. 461-492. 
3 .  See i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Buchanan and T o l l i s o n ,  op. c i t .  and Goldberg, op. 
c i t .  I n  t r e a t i n g  t o g e t h e r  t h e s e  two approaches ,  I am n o t  over look ing  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  e x i s t  between them, e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h e  assessment  o f  p o l i c i e s  f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  "market f a i l u r e s . "  But f o r  t h e  
determine how extending t h e  domain of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  de te rmina t ion  of 
t h e  r u l e s  themselves changes the  r e l a t i v e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of c e r t a i n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
arrangements. l v 4  For ins tance ,  t h e  amount of resources  t h a t  a group w i l l  have 
t o  inf luence  r u l e  changes depends on i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  induce p o t e n t i a l  f r e e  
r i d e r s  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  group, and upon the  a b i l i t y  of opposing groups 
t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e i r  £re,? r i d e r s .  Hence, i n t e r e s t  groups have an  incen t ive  t o  
i n v e s t  resources  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  t he  r u l e s  concerning c o a l i t i o n s ;  i n  Goldberg's 
a p t  expression,  t he  r u l e s  "both de f ine  t h e  e x i s t i n g  environment f o r  choice and 
provide an a rena  f o r  c o n f l i c t . "  C i t i z e n  groups, f o r  example, w i l l  pres s  f o r  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of c l a s s  a c t i o n  i n  cou r t ,  by which an ind iv idua l  o r  organiza- 
t i o n  can sue on behalf of l a r g e  numbers of s i m i l a r l y  a f f ec t ed  c i t i z e n s ,  in-  
s t ead  of t h e  so-called nuisance doc t r ine ,  whereby an ind iv idua l  can  sue a 
p o l l u t e r  only i f  he can show t h a t  he i s  uniquely a f f e c t e d  by h i s  a c t i v i t i e s .  
S imi l a r ly ,  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  resources  (money, vo te s ,  t echn ica l  
e x p e r t i s e ,  s o c i a l  p r e s t i g e )  a r e  valued d i f f e r e n t l y  under a l t e r n a t i v e  i n s t i t u -  
t i o n a l  arrangements. Thus, groups w i l l  at tempt  t o  b r i n g  about r u l e  changes 
t h a t  reward the  resources i n  which they have a comparative advantage. Even 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  boundaries a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  manipulation by people t r y i n g  t o  
change them i n  t h e i r  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  Gerrymandering i s  an obvious example, 
but  s i m i l a r  forms of jur isdict ion-changing behavior can be found i n  the  en- 
vironmental f i e l d ,  s e e  s e c t i o n  4. 
- -  -- - 
purpose of t he  present  d i scuss ion ,  i t  i s  the commonality of t h e  b a s i c  i n s i g h t s  
t h a t  is important.  Lindblom's work on dec i s ion  making through mutual ad jus t -  
ment should a l s o  be mentioned i n  t h i s  connect ion.  
4. V. P. Goldberg, op. c i t . ,  p. 464. 
The a t t i t u d e s  of most econon~ists  toward such manipulations of t h e  in- 
s t i t u t i o n a l  framework have been of two kinds: they have e i t h e r  neglec ted  t h e  
phenomenon, being content ,  a s  Knut Wicksell remarked many years  ago, wi th  
assuming t h e  presence of a  benevolent d i c t a t o r  capable of defending t h e  pub l i c  
i n t e r e s t  more e f f e c t i v e l y  than an imperfect  democratic system; o r  a t t r i b u t i n g  
the  cause of t h e  e v i l  t o  t he  c o r r u p t i b i l i t y  of t h e  instruments  used by t h e  
po l i cy  maker, they have proposed mechanisms t h a t  a r e  supposedly f a i l - s a f e  wi th  
5 
r e spec t  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Actual ly,  both a t t i t u d e s  
o f t e n  coex i s t  i n  t h e  same w r i t e r .  
The cap tu re  of t h e  r egu la to ry  commissions by t h e  very i n t e r e s t s  they a r e  
supposed t o  con t ro l ,  and t h e  u l t ima te  f u t i l i t y  of economic r egu la t ion ,  have been 
repea ted ly  d iscussed ,  and t o  some e x t e n t  documented.6 These f a c t s  have been i n t e r -  
5. A t h i r d  approach has been suggested by Goldberg: exhor t a t ion  o r  pro- 
pagandizing -- t r y i n g  t o  induce people t o  a c t  o the r  than  i n  t h e i r  immediate s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  o r  simply foo l ing  them i n t o  a c t i n g  otherwise.  Regulations,  l i c e n s e s ,  
subs id ies ,  acce l e ra t ed  dep rec i a t ion  a r e  not  good f o r  soc i e ty ,  and the re f  o re  
b e n e f i c i a r i e s  should not  use  t h e i r  resources t o  buy them. 
6. For a  sample of t h e  r e l evan t  l i t e r a t u r e ,  s e e  George J.  S t i g l e r  and 
C l a i r e  Fr ied land ,  "What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case Of E l e c t r i c i t y " ,  
The Jou rna l  Of Law And Economics,,V, October 1962, pp. 1-16; Paul  W. Mac Avoy, 
ed.  The C r i s i s  Of The Regulatory commissions, New York: W .  W .  Norton, Inc . ,  
1970; George J.  S t i g l e r , "  The Theory Of Economic ~ e ~ u l a t i o n " ,  The Be l l  Jou rna l  
Of Economics And Management Science, vo l .  2, no. 1, Spring 1971, pp. 3-21; 
Richard A. Posner,  "Theories Of Economic Regulation", The Bel l  Journa l  Of 
Economics And Management Science, vo l .  5,  no. 2, Autumn 1974, pp= 335-358- 
preted as providing additional confirmation of the virtues of the market, and 
of the need to reduce governmental intervention. This critical literature has 
its counterpart in many analyses of environmental problems, where the administra- 
tive approach to pollution control (prohibitions, standards, incentives, and so 
on) has been severely criticized for its lack of effectiveness, and for its 
tendency to become "a political process entailing bargaining between parties 
of unequal power ."7 Effluent charges and related market-oriented techniques have 
been proposed as alternative approaches that, by their automatism and in conjunc- 
tion with the integrated management of river basins and airsheds, "would reduce 
the scope for administrative discretion and bargaining. It8 
But these normative conclusions overlook one important point: the same forces 
that influence and distort the regulatory framework, will also affect other 
approaches, by the same or by different methods. The comparison between, say, 
an uncorrupted system of effluent charges, and a regulatory machinery captured 
by special interests, is a specious one.' Where effluent charges have been used, 
for instance, in France, they have proved to be as subject to bargaining and as 
conditioned by considerations of political and administrative expediency, as 
standards, licenses, and other regulatory measures. Thus, the search for a 
system that "would resolve most of the political conflict over the environment 
-. 
7. A. Myrick Freeman 111, Robert H. Haveman, Allen V. Kneese, The 
-
Economics Of Environmental Policy, New York: John ~iley and Sons, Inc., 1973, 
p. 105. 
8. Ibid. p. 170. 
9. Goldberg makes the same point in connection with recent theories 
of economic regulations. 
i n  a  h igh ly  v i s i b l e  way", i n  t h e  same sense  i n  which PPBS was supposed t o  l i f t  
t h e  budgetary process  ou t  of t he  morass of p o l i t i c a l  compromise, i s  bound t o  
lead t o  disappointments  and, i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t o  doubts  "as t o  t h e  a b i l i t y  
of a  p l u r a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  system t o  make wise choices  i n  i s s u e s  of t h i s  s o r t .  1110 
I f  barga in ing  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  because of t h e  disagreement over va lues ,  in- 
s u f f i c i e n t  eco log ica l  knowledge, compet i t ion w i t h  o t h e r  pub l i c  programs, and 
s e r i o u s  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  consequences, t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e  environmental p o l i c i e s ,  
then focus ing  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of improving t h e  ba rga in ing  pro- 
ce s s ,  and t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework wi th in  which t h e  process  ope ra t e s ,  seems 
a  more c o n s t r u c t i v e  and hopeful  approach. The a b i l i t y  of t h e  po l i cy  maker t o  
nudge t h e  process  toward des i red  outcomes depends on h i s  r e a l i s t i c  apprecia-  
t i o n  of i t s  dynamics, and on the  sober assessmen.t of t h e  degrees  of freedom of 
t h e  system. The a c t u a l  outcomes of environmental p o l i c i e s  a r e  more s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements emerging from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
p rocess  then by t h e  t e c h n i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  ins t ruments  used. To use  
a  s t a t i s t i c a l  image, t h e  "within group" e f f e c t s  (meaning t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  r e s u l t s  
obtained when t h e  same t o o l  ope ra t e s  under d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c i rcumstances)  
dominate t h e  "between groups" e f f e c t s  ( t h e  r e s u l t s  of d i f f e r e n t  t o o l s  used under 
approximately equal  c o n d i t i o n s ) .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  choice  i s  n o t  
among a b s t r a c t l y  considered p o l i c y  instruments ,  bu t  among i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  de- 
. termined ways of o p e r a t i n g  them. Such a  choice cannot be made by f i a t :  i t  
r e s u l t s  from t h e  r e l a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power, t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
and t h e  s k i l l  of t h e  p o l i c y  maker t o  e x p l o i t  whatever s l a c k  remains i n  t h e  
system. This  conc lus ion  throws new l i g h t  on t h e  systemic r a t i o n a l i t y  of p o l i c i e s  
- 
10. Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, op. c i t . ,  p. 104. 
t h a t  would be r e j e c t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of some narrow c r i t e r i o n ,  such a s  economic 
e f f i c i ency .  
2. APPROACHES TO POLLUTION CONTROL 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  I s h a l l  review the  major t o o l s  of p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  
po l icy ,  under t h e  headings: a )  regula t ion ,  d i r e c t  p u b l i c  a c t i o n  and sub- 
s i d i e s ;  b) e f f l u e n t  charges; c )  c o n t r a c t  and r e d e f i n i t i o n  of p rope r ty  r i g h t s ;  
d )  organiza t ion .  
Regulation may e i t h e r  c o n s i s t  of genera l  r u l e s ,  o r  of s p e c i f i c  dec i s ions  
on ind iv idua l  c a s e s  ( d i r e c t i v e s ) .  Some examples a r e  e f f l u e n t  s tandards ,  l i c e n s e s ,  
des ign  and product ion norms, and p roh ib i t i ons .  The p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  may a l s o  
dec ide  t o  i n t e rvene  d i r e c t l y  t o  r e l i e v e  t h e  consequences of a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e r i o u s  
environmental condi t ion ,  o r  t o  augment environmental resources  through investment.  
Subs id ies  and o t h e r  forms of economic incen t ives ,  such a s  acce l e ra t ed  deprecia-  
t i o n  f o r  t a x  purposes, occupy an in te rmedia te  p o s i t i o n  between r egu la t ion  and 
d i r e c t  i n t e rven t ion .  
Among t h e  r egu la to ry  too l s ,  e f f l u e n t  o r  emission s tandards  a r e  probably 
t h e  best-known and most f requent ly  used. l1 I n  theory, e f f l u e n t  s tandards  should 
. be  e s t a b l i s h e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  optimum l e v e l  of environmental q u a l i t y  (where 
marginal  t reatment  c o s t s  equa l  marginal damages, o r  t o t a l  c o s t  of r e s i d u a l  d i s -  
posa l  i s  a t  a  minimum) o r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  on an e x p l i c i t  ambient q u a l i t y  s tandard.  
- --.- .-- 
11. See my paper,  "On The Logic Of Standard S e t t i n g  I n  Heal th  And Re- 
l a t e d  Fields ,"  i n  N.T.J. Bai ley and M. Thompson, e d i t o r s ,  Systems Analysis  of 
Heal th  Planning, Amsterdam: North Holland Publ i sh ing  Co., 1975, pp. 279-290. 
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I n  p r a c t i c e ,  e f f l u e n t  s tandards  a r e  o f t e n  a r b i t r a r y ,  i n  t he  sense  t h a t  they 
a r e  no t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  achievement of s p e c i f i c  goa l s  of environmental q u a l i t y ,  
bu t  a r e  based on some r u l e  of "good p rac t i ce . "  Whatever t h e  b a s i s  f o r  dec id ing  
on a t o t a l  a l lowable q u a n t i t y  of r e s i d u a l s  d i scharge ,  d i f f i c u l t  problems of im- 
p lementat ion a r i s e  when t h e  pub l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  have t o  a l l o c a t e  t h i s  t o t a l  among 
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  d i s cha rge r s .  For a given l e v e l  of allowed d i scha rge ,  t o t a l  c o s t  
i s  minimized when t h e  marginal t reatment  c o s t s  of a l l  d i s cha rge r s  a r e  equal .  
But i n  t h e  absence of such d e t a i l e d  c o s t  information,  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  have 
t o  r e l y  on some r u l e  of thumb (e.g.  equa l  s tandards  f o r  a l l )  t h a t  i s  h igh ly  un- 
l i k e l y  t o  correspond t o  a minimum-cost a l l o c a t i o n  of d i scharge  permi ts .  
E f f l u e n t  charges  a r e  o f t e n  considered,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by economists,  t h e  
b e s t  t o o l  of environmental po l icy .  The under ly ing  l o g i c  i s  simple and compelling. 
I f  t h e  damage caused by d i f f e r e n t  concent ra t ions  of r e s i d u a l s  were known, t h e  
pub l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  would simply e s t a b l i s h  a charge o r  p r i c e  equa l  t o  t h e  marginal 
damage f o r  each u n i t  of r e s i d u a l s .  P o l l u t e r s  would then decrease  t h e i r  r e s i d u a l s  
flows a s  long a s  t h e  marginal c o s t  of doing so  was l e s s  than the  p r i c e  f o r  d i s -  
charging,  s e t t l i n g  a t  t h e  optimum where marginal t rea tment  c o s t s  equa l  t h e  charge.  
Even when t h e  damage func t ion  i s  unknown, t h e  usua l  case ,  t h e  system can b e  used, 
w i t h  a ( p o l i t i c a l l y  determined) environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard r ep l ac ing  t h e  un- 
known damage func t ion ;  however, knowledge of marginal t rea tment  c o s t s  must be  
.assumed. The c o r r e c t  charge equa ls  t h e  marginal t rea tment  c o s t  a t  t h e  p o i n t  where 
t h e  marginal t rea tment  c o s t  curve  meets t h e  environmental q u a l i t y  s t anda rd .  I n  
e i t h e r  case ,  t h e  environmental goal would be  reached a t  minimum s o c i a l  c o s t .  
With r e spec t  t o  economic e f f i c i e n c y  and environmental e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  
e f f l u e n t  charges  a r e  t h e  converse,  so  t o  say,  of e f f l u e n t  s t anda rds .  Given a 
s e t  of ambient s tandards  and app rop r i a t e  enforcement procedures,  e f f l u e n t  stand- 
a r d s  can always be c a l c u l a t e d  so a s  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  environmental ob j ec t i ve ;  bu t  
t h e r e  i s  no why of knowing t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  met i n  an economically e f f i c i e n t  
manner. On the  o t h e r  hand, f o r  any given l e v e l  of  e f f l u e n t  charges ,  t h e  r e s u l t -  
i n g  reduc t ion  i n  p o l l u t i o n  i s  achieved a t  t h e  l e a s t  c o s t ,  b u t  t h e r e  i s  no guarantee 
t h a t  t h e  charges  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  meet t h e  environmental s t anda rds .  However, any 
v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  ambient s t anda rds  can be  qu ick ly  de t ec t ed ,  and then, so  goes t h e  
argument, i t  would s u f f i c e  t o  r a i s e  t h e  charges  u n t i l  t h e  s t anda rds  a r e  s a t i s f i e d .  
The informat ion  necessary t o  s e t  c o r r e c t  e f f l u e n t  charges i s  never  g r e a t e r  than  
t h a t  requi red  f o r  e f f l u e n t  s tandards ,  and i n  many s i t u a t i o n s  i t  w i l l  be a c t u a l l y  
less. This  fo l lows  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  o rde r  t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  opt imal  charges  
i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  know t h e  aggregate  volume of waste flows from t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
p o l l u t i o n  sources ,  while  t h e  t o t a l  volume would have t o  be  d i saggrega ted  i n  o r d e r  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  e f f l u e n t  s t anda rds  capable  of ach iev ing  t h e  same waste  r educ t ion  a t  
t h e  same c o s t  a s  e f f l u e n t  charges .  12 
The nex t  group of p o l i c y  ins t ruments  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of a t tempts  t o  in- 
t e r n a l i z e  environmental e x t e r n a l i t i e s  through u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  e x i s t i n g  l e g a l  
system, o r  a  b e t t e r  d e f i n i t i o n  and enforcement of p rope r ty  r i g h t s .  Whenever 
t h e  c o s t  of reduc ing  t h e  damage i n f l i c t e d  by a  po l lu t i on -c rea t ing  a c t i v i t y  (by 
decreas ing  t h e  s c a l e  o r  changing t h e  technology of t h e  ope ra t i on )  i s  l e s s  than 
the  b e n e f i t s  c r ea t ed  by t h e  abatement, t h e r e  a r i s e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a  con- 
t r a c t u a l  s o l u t i o n .  The p o l l u t e e s  can a f f o r d  t o  pay t h e  p o l l u t e r  enough t o  cover 
t h e  abatement c o s t s ,  and i n  such a  way t h a t  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  advantageous f o r  
a l l  p a r t i e s  concerned. 
12. See K.G. Maeler, Environmental Economics: A Theore t i ca l  Inqui ry ,  
Bal t imore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press ,  1974, pp. 204-207, f o r  some 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  t h i s  s ta tement .  
It should be no t iced  t h a t  such a  system of c o n t r a c t u a l  payments (or  
"bribes",  a s  they a r e  o f t e n  ca l l ed )  could i n  ~ r i n c i p l e  achieve t h e  same r e s u l t  
a s  a  scheme of optimal e f f l u e n t  charges .  The " in  p r i n c i p l e "  c h a r a c t e r  of t h i s  
s ta tement  must be s t r e s s e d ,  however. Unless t h e  number of p a r t i e s  i s  q u i t e  
small ,  t h e  f a m i l i a r  f r e e - r i d e r  phenomenon w i l l  appear.  Since i t  i s  t e c h n i c a l l y  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  exclude anyone from t h e  b e n e f i t s  of t h e  pol lut ion-abatement  measures, 
t h e  i ncen t ives  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  necessary payments a r e  correspondingly re- 
duced. This  w i l l  make t h e  con t r ac tua l  s o l u t i o n  i n f e a s i b l e  wi thout  some a s s i s t a n c e  
from t h e  s t a t e  t o  overcome t h e  f r ee - r ide r  problem. Nor i s  t h i s  t h e  only d i f f i -  
c u l t y .  How can one r u l e  out  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  s o l u t i o n  may 
degenerate  i n t o  a  form of blackmail ,  w i th  one p a r t y  c r e a t i n g  p o l l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  
purpose of e x t o r t i n g  payments from o t h e r s ?  The answer i s  t h a t  p o l l u t e r s  and 
p o l l u t e e s  a r e  assumed t o  a c t  wi th in  a  l e g a l  framework t h a t  determines t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  barga in ing  p o s i t i o n .  13 For i n s t ance ,  t h e  ex i s t ence  of a  r i g h t  of 
a p r i v a t e  i nd iv idua l  t o  seek an i n j u n c t i o n  o r  t o  sue  f o r  t h e  damage c r e a t e d  by 
a  po l lu t ion-genera t ing  a c t i v i t y  w i l l  s t r eng then  h i s  barga in ing  p o s i t i o n .  But 
i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  where one p o l l u t e r  i n f l i c t s  r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t  damages on a  l a r g e  
number of people,  t h e  barga in ing  advantage c r ea t ed  by t h e  r i g h t  i s  more apparen t  
t han  r e a l ,  i f  nuisance a c t i o n s  a r e  p o s s i b l e  only on a  case-by-case b a s i s ;  f o r  
t h e  c o s t s  of c o u r t  a c t i o n  would probably exceed t h e  expected b e n e f i t s .  Hence 
'we  can  expect  t h a t  a  good d e a l  of e f f o r t  w i l l  be devoted t o  make c l a s s  a c t i o n s  
pos s ib l e ,  o r  perhaps t o  i n t roduce  r egu la t i ons  forb idding  c e r t a i n  types  of a c t i v i t y  
(e.g., smoke ord inances) .  
13. Ralph Turvey, "Side E f f e c t s  Of Resources Use," i n  A. C. Enthoven 
and A. M. Freeman 111, e d i t o r s ,  P o l l u t i o n ,  Resources And The ~nv i ronmen t ,  
New York: W. W. Norton, 1971, pp. 59-71. 
It i s  now gene ra l l y  recognized t h a t  t h e  main d i f f i c u l t y  i n  i n t e r n a l i z i n g  t h e  
c o s t s  of environmental p o l l u t i o n  i s  t h e  ambiguos s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of exchangeable 
proper ty  r i g h t s  i n  media l i k e  water o r  a i r .  Dales '  proposal  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  
market i n  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s  i s  an  i n t e r e s t i n g  a t tempt  t o  remove some of t h e  
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ambiguity.  According t o  t h i s  proposal ,  t h e  government s e t s  an upper l i m i t  x  
( i n  equ iva l en t  tons)  t o  t h e  amounts of d i scharge  i n t o  t h e  environment of a  reg ion  
(water being t h e  environmental medium f o r  which t h e  proposa l  has  been o r i g i n a l l y  
advanced), f o r  a  given per iod  of t i m e .  It then i s s u e s  x  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s ,  o r  
l i c enses ,  and p u t s  them up f o r  s a l e ,  r e q u i r i n g  a t  t h e  same time t h a t  everyone 
who d ischarges  one equ iva l en t  ton  of waste during,  say, a  year ,  should hold one 
p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  year .  I f  x  is  less than t h e  number of equ iva l en t  
tons of waste be ing  c u r r e n t l y  discharged,  t h e  r i g h t s  w i l l  command a  p o s i t i v e  
p r i c e ,  and a  continuous market w i l l  develop i n  response t o  t h e  compet i t ion  among 
buyers  and s e l l e r s  of p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s .  
The proposal  has  cons iderab le  mer i t s .  I t  achieves  an e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  
of resources ,  even under q u i t e  complex circumstances; l5 i t  provides  a  p lanning  
t o o l  t h a t  u t i l i z e s ,  t o  t h e  maximum e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e  w i th in  t h e  framework of an 
a r t i f i c i a l l y  c r ea t ed  market, t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  provided by t h e  p r i c e  mechanism; 
it reduces admin i s t r a t i ve  c o s t s  by r e l i e v i n g  admin i s t r a to r s  of  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
of  s e t t i n g  a  charge f o r  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s ,  and changing i C  p e r i o d i c a l l y  t o  r e f l e c t  
' r eg iona l  economic growth and d e c l i n e .  Las t  bu t  no t  l e a s t ,  whi le  a  r egu la to ry  
14. J .  H. Dales, Po l lu t i on ,  Property,  and P r i ce s ,  Toronto: Univers i ty  
of Toronto Press ,  1968. 
15. W. David Montgomery, "Markets I n  Licenses  And E f f i c i e n t  P o l l u t i o n  
Control  Programs", Journa l  Of Economic Theory, 5, 1972, pp. 395-418. 
approach i mp l i e s  a  kind of s t a t u s - t e n u r e  p rope r ty  r i g h t  t h a t  c an  on ly  b e  
t r a n s f e r r e d  when t h e  p rope r ty  t o  which i t  a p p l i e s  i s  so ld ,  t h e  proposed scheme 
s e p a r a t e s  t h e  p rope r ty  r i g h t  t o  environmental  use from t h e  o t h e r  a s s e t s  of  
t h e  d i s c h a rge r ,  the reby  making t h e  p rope r ty  r i g h t  f u l l y  t r a n s f e r a b l e .  Th i s  
i s  i n  agreement w i th  t h e  p r e f e r ence  f o r  c o n t r a c t u a l  s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  
l i b e r a l  democracies.  
Dales '  method p r e s e n t s  a l s o  a  number of d i f f i c u l t i e s  and dangers:  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of s u i t a b l e  environmental  r eg ions ;  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  t ime i n t e r v a l  
d u r i n g  which t h e  number of p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s  i s  f i xed ;  c o n t r o l  c o s t s ;  t h e  poss i -  
b i l i t y  t h a t  l i c e n s e s  may be hoarded i n  an  a t t empt  t o  c r e a t e  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y  
and monopol i s t i c  p o s i t i o n s ;  t h e  danger  of  a n  induced r educ t i on  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  
m o b i l i t y .  Even more important  f o r  an  assessment  of t h e  p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of t h e  p roposa l ,  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  system can on ly  work i f  t h e  government i s  
adamant i n  i t s  de t e rmina t i on  no t  t o  change t h e  r i g h t s  i s s u e  d u r i n g  t h e  chosen 
t ime i n t e r v a l ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s  t o  do  s o  t h a t  can  be  
a n t i c i p a t e d .  " P o l l u t i o n  r i gh t s " ,  Dales  w r i t e s ,  " a r e  f u l l y  t r a n s f e r a b l e  pro- 
p e r t y  r i g h t s ,  and any welching on t h e  enforcement of t h e  r i g h t  would be a  
b reach  of t r u s t . "  But one wonders by which i n s t i t u t i o n a l  means an environ-  
mental  p o l i c y  of  t h i s  type  would succeed i n  r e s o l v i n g  t h e  c o n f l i c t  between 
i n t e g r i t y  and expediency t h a t  ha s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d ,  say,  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  f i s c a l  
p o l i c i e s  over  t h e  l a s t  decades .  The analogy w i t h  t h e  d i f f i c u l t  r e l a t i o n s  bet-  
ween t h e  U.S. Congress, t h e  c e n t r a l  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and t h e  execu t i ve  
over f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s  i s ,  I would a rgue ,  a  p e r t i n e n t  one, and j u s t i f i e s  a  good 
d e a l  of s k ep t i c i sm  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  I t  i s  known, f o r  i n s t ance ,  t h a t  on a  number 
of occas ions ,  t h e  Fede ra l  Reserve Board h a s  y i e lded  t o  p r e s s u r e  from Congress 
and t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  avoid h i g h e r  e x p l i c i t  t axe s ,  by s t and ing  ready  t o  purchase 
(or  lend aga ins t )  any q u a n t i t y  of government s e c u r i t i e s  a t  pa r .  16 Can one 
r e a l l y  expect t h a t  t he  environmental a u t h o r i t i e s  would be  a b l e  t o  with- 
s t and  analogous ~ o l i t i c a l  p r e s su re s  t o  tamper wi th  t h e  r u l e s  of t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  
market i n  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s ?  The p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of a  p o l i c y  instrument ,  
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  a s , i t  may be, cannot be eva lua ted  wi thout  some s p e c i f i c  
assumptions about t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework i n  which i t  i s  supposed t o  opera te .  
Up t o  t h i s  po in t ,  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  has  proceeded a s  i f  c o n t r o l  of waste 
d i s cha rges  and of dangerous emissions a t  i n d i v i d u a l  point-sources ,  was t h e  only 
way of dea l ing  wi th  p o l l u t i o n  problems. Actual ly ,  a  broader  approach i s  o f t e n  
c a l l e d  f o r ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  two reasons.  F i r s t ,  important  economies of s c a l e  can 
be  achieved by j o i n t  a c t i o n .  I n  t h e  f i e l d  of water management, f o r  example, low- 
f low augmentation, s t ream reae ra t i on ,  ground-water recharge  f o r  q u a l i t y  improve- 
ment, and e f f l u e n t  d i v e r s i o n  o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  t o  make b e t t e r  use of n a t u r a l  
a s s i m i l a t i v e  capac i ty ,  a r e  more e f f i c i e n t l y  organized on a  c o l l e c t i v e  b a s i s .  
Second, t h e r e  a r e  important  in te rdependencies  among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  uses  of t h e  
environment, which cannot be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  t r ea t ed  a t  t h e  micro leve l .  
Consequently, i t  has  been proposed t.hat agencies  be c r e a t e d  t o  manage 
r i v e r  ba s in s  and a i r s h e d s  on an i n t e g r a t e d  b a s i s .  I n  t h e  s t r o n g  v e r s i o n  of 
t h e  proposal ,  t h e  agencies  should be empowered t o  plan, design,  c o n s t r u c t ,  
ope ra t e ,  and f inance  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  environmental qua l i t y - con t ro l  measures. 17 
16. Armen A. Alchian and William R. Allen, u n i v e r s i t y  Economics, London: 
P r e n t i c e I H a l l  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Inc. ,  3rd e d i t .  1974, ch. 2 8 .  
17. Allen V. Kneese and B l a i r  T. Bower, Managing Water Qual i ty:  
Economics, Technology, I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  Baltimore and London: The Johns Hop- 
k i n s  Press ,  1968, ch. 10. 
No e x i s t i n g  organiza t ion  f u l l y  r e a l i z e s  t h i s  goal,  but  t he  Wassergenossen- 
schaf ten  of t h e  Ruhr reg ion  i n  Germany, the  Regional Water Boards (Hooghernm- 
raadschap) i n  t he  Netherlands and, perhaps, t he  Delaware River Basin Commission 
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  a r e  reasonably c l o s e  approximations. Expecta t ions  t h a t  
t h e  French River Basin Agencies (Agences Financieres  de Bassin) c rea ted  by 
the  loi-cadre of December 16, 1964, would be given au tho r i ty  t o  bu i ld  and 
opera te  reg iona l -sca le  p r o j e c t s  have n o t  been f u l f i l l e d  so  f a r .  
The e x t e n t  of t h e  powers t h a t  an environmental p ro t ec t ion  o rgan iza t ion  
should have, i s  only one of t he  problems of i n s t i t u t i o n  bu i ld ing  i n  t h i s  a rea ,  
and no t  t h e  most important one. The c r u c i a l  i s sue  i s  t h a t  of ba lanc ing  t h e  
immediate needs of environmental e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and economic e f f i c i e n c y  wi th  
t h e  long-run requirements of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  v i a b i l i t y .  The c e n t r a l  r o l e  played 
by bargaining processes  i n  r e c o n c i l i n g  these  c o n f l i c t i n g  aims has been ab ly  
discussed by Matthew ~ o l d e n ' ~ ,  and l i t t l e  needs t o  be added t o  h i s  a n a l y s i s  
a t  t h i s  po in t  of my argument. However, the  experience of t h e  French r i v e r  
bas in  agencies ,  about which more w i l l  b e  sa id  l a t e r ,  may be mentioned here  a s  
a good example of t he  gap s e p a r a t i n g  synopt ic  i d e a l s  from a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e .  
According t o  two we l l  known American expe r t s ,  w r i t i n g  a few years  a f t e r  t he  
enactment of t h e  1964 law, 
1 1  [ t l h e  French agencies  ...... seem t o  have an abso lu t e ly  c l e a r  ob- 
j e c t i v e  -- economic e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t h e  f u l l  sense of t h e  term. 
The aim i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  n system i n  which t h e  incremental c o s t s  
I - 
18. Matthew Holden Jr.,  P o l l u t i o n  Control a s  a Bargaining Process ,  
I t haca ,  New York: Cornel l  Univers i ty  Water Resource Center, 1966. 
of f u r t h e r  improvement of water q u a l i t y  balance t h e  incremental  
bene f i t s ,  and i n  which the  f u l l  range of a l t e r n a t i v e  ways of 
improving water q u a l i t y  can be assessed and a l l  measures brought 
i n t o  optimal balance. 1119 
The a c t u a l  r e s u l t s  have been d i f f e r e n t ,  a s  noted by a  r ecen t  French observer: 
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I t  There i s  no doubt t h a t  t he  Agences f inanc ie re s  de bass in  a r e  
the  keystone of t h e  system, bu t  one cannot f a i l  t o  be s t r u c k  by 
t h e  motley a r r ay  of arrangements f o r  i s s u i n g  l i c e n s e s  and of 
technica l  and economic con t ro l s .  On t he  one hand, users  a r e  
faced with a  p l e tho ra  of complicated regula t ions ,  while,  on 
the  o the r  hand e f f o r t s  a re  being made t o  remedy the  d e f e c t s  by 
means of more modern arrangements which include shadow program- 
ming on the  l i n e s  of t he  French Economic Plan and depend on 
economic incen t ives  involving f i n a n c i a l  l o s s  f o r  those who 
cause po l lu t ion  i n  def iance  of t h e  r e g ~ ~ l a t i o n s  ." 
Even i n  the  land of Car tes ian  c l a r i t y ,  t he  pol icy  maker does not w r i t e  on a  
c l e a n  s l a t e ;  second-best so lu t ions  a r e  t h e  inev i t ab le  r e s u l t  of t he  c l a sh  bet-  
ween technocra t ic  a s p i r a t i o n s  and what Toynbee has ca l l ed  the  " i n t r a c t a b i l i t y  
of i n s t i t u t i o n s . "  
- -- . . . . . . . .- . . . . . . . . - -.  . . . - -. .- 
19. Kneese and Bower, Managing Water Qua l i ty ,  c i t . ,  p. 283. 
20. Jean-Phil l ipe Barde, "An Examination Of The Polluter-Pays P r i n c i p l e  
Based On Case Studies",  i n  Organizat ion For Economic GO-Operation And Develop- 
ment, The P o l l u t e r  Pays P r inc ip l e ,  Pa r i s :  O.E.C.D.,  1975, P- 100- 
3 .  THE CHOICE PROBLEM 
Faced with a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of poss ib le  approaches, how does the  pol icy  
maker choose t h e  most promising instrument,  o r  combination of instruments? 
O r  i s  t h i s ,  perhaps, a  misleading way of r ep resen t ing  h i s  problem? These 
a r e  t h e  i s s u e s  t o  be examined now. 
The synoptic  problem solver  would proceed along f a m i l i a r  l i n e s .  
2 1 He 
would s t a r t  ou t  by e x p l i c i t l y  l i s t i n g  a. s e t  of c r i t e r i a ;  he would then s e l e c t  
t h a t  tool ,  a  mixture of t oo l s ,  t h a t  i s  optimal with r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  chosen 
c r i t e r i a  o r  a t  l e a s t ,  i s  no t  uniformly dominated by any o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  
A l t e rna t ive ly ,  he may s i n g l e  out  one c r i t e r i o n  a s  the  most important one, 
which then becomes h i s  ope ra t iona l  goal, t r e a t i n g  o ther  releva.nt  c r i t e r i a  
a s  c o n s t r a i n t s  . 
. ... - 
21. The synoptic  problem solver :  "1. i d e n t i f i e s ,  s c r u t i n i z e s ,  and 
puts  i n t o  c o n s i s t e n t  order  those objec t ives  and o the r  va lues  t h a t  he be l ieves  
should govern t h e  choice of a  s o l u t i o n  to  t h e  problem; 2. comprehensively 
surveys a l l  poss ib l e  means of achieving those values; 3 .  exhaus t ive ly  examines 
the  probable consequences of employing each of t h e  poss ib l e  means; 4.  chooses 
a  means -- t h a t  i s ,  a  po l i cy  o r  combination of p o l i c i e s  -- t h a t  w i l l  probably 
achieve a  maximum of the  va lues  o r  achieve some acceptable  l e v e l  of achieve- 
ment." Cf . Charles E.  Lindbolm, The I n t e l l i g e n c e  Of Democracy, New York: 
- 
The Free Press ,  1965, pp. 137-138. 
The c r i t e r i a  commonly used i n  synopt ic  eva lua t ions  of environmental 
po l i cy  t o o l s  a r e :  environmental e f f e c t i v e n e s s ;  economic e f f i c i e n c y ;  p o l i t i c a l  
and admin i s t r a t i ve  f e a s i b i l i t y ;  f l e x i b i l i t y ;  compa t ib i l i t y  with t h e  e x i s t i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework (e .g . ,  wi th  t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  of a  market economy). 
I n  add i t i on ,  a  good d e a l  of a t t e n t i o n  has  been r e c e n t l y  given, e s p e c i a l l y  by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  l i k e  O.E.C.D. and t h e  European Economic Community, 
t o  t h e  so-called po l lu te r -pays  p r i n c i p l e ,  a s  a  s o r t  of h igher - leve l  c r i t e r i o n .  
The p r i n c i p l e  says  t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t e r  should bear t h e  expenses of c a r r y i n g  
out  t h e  measures decided by the  pub l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  ensure t h a t  t h e  environ- 
ment i s  i n  an acceptab le  condi t ion .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  means two th ings :  
(1) t h e  c o s t  of t he se  measures should be ref lec . ted i n  t h e  c o s t  of goods and 
s e r v i c e s  causing p o l l u t i o n  i n  product ion and/or consumption; (2) t he  measures 
should n o t  be accompanied by s u b s i d i e s  t h a t  would d i s t o r t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
and investment.  
The f i r s t  t h i n g  t o  be not iced about t h e  c r i t e r i a  i s  t h e  he t e rogene i ty  of 
t h e  va lues  t h a t  they i n d i v i d u a l l y  embody; t h e  second, i s  t h e i r  l ack  of s p e c i f i c i t y .  
Value he t e rogene i ty  i s  exemplified by t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of reconci l . ing p o l i t i c a l  
f e a s i b i l i t y  wi th  t h e  condi t ions  f o r  economic e f f i c i e n c y .  The l ack  of s p e c i f i -  
c i t y  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  obvious i n  t h e  case  of t h e  po l lu te r -pays  p r i n c i p l e  which, 
a s  u sua l ly  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  r u l e s  ou t  only t h e  s u b s i d i e s  a l t e rna t ive ; .  and even t h i s  
' l i m i t a t i o n  i s  weakened by a  number of except ions .  2  2  
.. . . "~. ~ . - - -.-. -. - . -- . . - 
22 .  Exceptions a r e  gene ra l l y  admitted i n  case of acu t e  socio-economic 
d i s l o c a t i o n  o r  of c o n f l i c t s  w i th  o t h e r  governmental ob j ec t i ve s ,  such a s  r eg iona l  
development, o r  i n  o rde r  t o  s t imu la t e  experimentat ion wi th  new p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  
t echnologies .  The p r i n c i p l e  could perhaps be  i n t e rp re t ed  s o  a s  t o  r u l e  ou t  a l s o  
t h e  "bribe" s o l u t i o n ,  and any o t h e r  form of barga in ing  . But t h i s  a  p r i o r i  
In view of the partially conflicting nature of the criteria, it is not 
surprising that a uniformly better approach cannot be found. Even with respect 
to a single criterion, there is no generally superior approach. Thus, although 
the superiority of effluent charges over regulation is assumed by most economists, 
it has been shown that an economically optimal policy may require a combination 
of both. In the case of fisheries, for instance, optimality is achieved by a 
2 3 
tax on catch, accompanied by regulation of mesh size. And while the in- 
effectiveness of regulatory environmental policies has been documented in a 
number of studies, an unbiased observer can easily find non trivial counter- 
examples. The United Kingdom Clean Air Act of 1956, for example, has been 
quite effective in reducing the level of smoke emissions in the atmosphere. 
This law relies primarily on prohibitions, regulations (of smoke emissions, 
with a varying standard depending on location, and of height of chimneys), 
and on various forms of subsidies to consumers and industries. The positive 
results achieved can be shown by a number of indices. In 1951, domestic con- 
sumers used 11.9 billion therms (1 therm = 100.000 British thermal units) of 
solid fuel, out of a total consumption of 14.1 billion therms, in 1971 total 
consumption had remained at the same level, but consumption of solid fuel had 
been reduced to 6.1 billion therms. In 1952, domestic users, industries, and 
railways used 37.3, 63.3, and 14.1 million tons of coal, respectively, but only 
'27.4, 37.9, and 2.8 million tons in 1965. Finally, the emission of smoke de- 
creased from 2.42 million metric tons (mrnt) in 1951, to 1.56 in 1961 and 0.77 
exclusion of potentially useful methods should be regarded as a serious short- 
coming of the principle, even if it increases its selective power. 
23. Ralph Turvey, "Optimization And Suboptimization In Fishery Regulation," 
The American Economic Review, March 1964, pp. 64-76. 
i n  1970 (on the  o ther  hand, t he  emission of sulphur dioxide,  t h a t  was l e f t  out  
of t he  scope of t he  1956 Act, went from 4.77 mmt i n  1951, t o  5.53 i n  1961 and 
5.95 i n  1970) . 
The imposs ib i l i t y  of f ind ing  an unambiguous ranking of po l i cy  instruments  
has led some a n a l y s t s  t o  conclude t h a t  one should always use a  mixture of i n s t ru -  
ments, and t h a t  "each case must be considered on i t s  own mer i t s .  !lz4 But t h i s  
sync re t i c  philosophy f a i l s  t o  recognize t h e  r e a l  source of t h e  d i f f i c u l t y .  Let  
us consider  aga in  economic e f f i c i e n c y  a s  a  c r i t e r i o n  of choice. A l l  t h ree  price-  
based approaches discussed i n  s e c t i o n  2 ( e f f l u e n t  charges,  b r ibes ,  and marketable 
p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s )  s a t i s f y  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ,  i n  s p i t e  of s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e rences  i n  
the  corresponding i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements. Thus, under t h e  b r i b e s  system, 
the po l lu t ees  o r  t h e  publ ic  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f f e r  t o  pay a n  amount equal t o  t h e  
marginal damage avoided f o r  each decrease i n  r e s i d u a l s  discharge.  Since an 
a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t  of d ischarge  r ep resen t s  an opportuni ty c o s t  f o r  t h e  p o l l u t e r ,  
equal  t o  the  foregone r e c e i p t  of t h e  br ibe ,  t h e  method would have t h e  same a l l o -  
c a t i v e  consequences a s  a  system of charges: t h e  two instruments  a r e  equiva lent  
i n  terms of economic e f f i c i ency .  But i n  t h e  b r i b e s  so lu t ion ,  proper ty  r i g h t s  
i n  the  environment a r e  held t o  be vested i n  the  p o l l u t e r s ,  while  t h e  use of 
charges implies  t h a t  those r i g h t s  a r e  vested i n  the  community, wi th  the  pub l i c  
~ ..-....-.--- 
24. See, f o r  ins tance ,  Ralph Turvey, "Side E f f e c t s  Of Resource Use", 
c i t . ;  0. A. Davies and M. I. Kainien, "Ex te rna l i t i e s ,  Information And Alterna- 
t i v e  Co l l ec t ive  Action" i n  The Analysis And Evaluat ion Of Publ ic  Expenditures: 
The PPB System, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g  Off i c e ,  1969, 
pp. 67-68; Rat von Sachverstaendiger.  f u e r  Umweltfragen, Umweltgutachten 1974, 
S t u t t g a r t :  Verlag Kohlhammer, G.M.B.H. 1974. 
a u t h o r i t i e s  a c t i n g  a s  agents  f o r  t h e  s a l e  of r i g h t s  t o  t h e  a s s i m i l a t i v e  capac i ty  
of t h e  environment. The a c t u a l  imp l i ca t i ons  of t h e  charges approach have been 
recognized by i n d u s t r i a l  spokesmen, who have a t t acked  e f f l u e n t  charges  a s  "puni- 
t i v e  l e v i e s , "  whose purpose i s  not  p o l l u t i o n  abatement, bu t  revenue and "u l t ima te ly ,  
a  c o n t r o l  over t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. "25 Advocates of t h e  approach i n  a  sense  sha re  
t h e  same view when they admit t h a t  " [ s luch  massive t r a n s f e r s  of p rope r ty  r i g h t s  
and t h e  weal th  they r ep re sen t  seldom occur i n  t h e  absence of s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  
upheaval. 1126 
The inadequacy of economic e f f i c i e n c y  a s  a  c r i t e r i o n  of choice  among p o l i c y  
ins t ruments  i s  now c l e a r ,  i f  i t  i s  admitted t h a t  e f f i c i e n c y  and e q u i t y  considera- 
t i o n s  cannot be  separa ted  i n  po l i cy  making (al though they may be u s e f u l l y  d i s -  
t inguished  i n  o t h e r ,  more l im i t ed ,  con tex t s ) .  For, a s  Coase has  shown, t h e  ab- 
sence or ex i s t ence  of a  r i g h t  t o  t h e  use of t h e  environment does n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  
a l l o c a t i o n  of resources ,  bu t  only t h e  f a i r n e s s  of what happens. More genera l ly ,  
i t  i s  impossible  t o  draw conclusions about app rop r i a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements 
from an  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  formal cond i t i ons  f o r  an optimum, s i n c e  t h e  same formal 
cond i t i ons  can be s a t i s f i e d  by a  v a r i e t y  of e s s e n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  arrangements.  27 
- . . -  .. .- . . .- .. .. .- - - -. ---  . -  -- 
25. John E  . Kinney, "Eff luent  Taxes: Abatement Prods O r  Budget-Balances?", 
I n d u s t r i a l  Water Engineering, A p r i l  1971, pp. 18-22. 
26. Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese, The Economics Of Environmental Pol icy ,  
c i t . ,  p. 170. 
27. I n  t h e  same way t h a t ,  a s  Pa re to  and Barone have shown, " the  equ i l i b r ium 
a l l o c a t i o n  of r e sou rces  i n  a  f r e e l y  compet i t ive  s o c i e t y  based on p r i v a t e  proper ty  
i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i th  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  t h a t  should be sought by a  s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e  s t r i v -  
i n g  t o  achieve a  maximum of "ophelimityl '  and t h a t ,  on t h e  formal l e v e l  a lone ,  
t o t a l i t a r i a n  d i r e c t i o n  might achieve t h e  same a l l o c a t i o n  of resources  a s  a  f r e e  
I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h i s  exp la in s  why so many d i scus s ions  of t h e  "economics of en- 
vironmental pol icy" f a i l  t o  c a r r y  convic t ion  i n  t h e i r  po l i cy  recommendations. 
The reason  i s  not  t h a t  they  d i s r ega rd  t h e  non-economic a spec t s  of environmental 
problems. Rather ,  t h e i r  t rea tment  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and l e g a l  
i s sues ,  o r  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  imp l i ca t i ons  of t h e  proposed s o l u t i o n s ,  u sua l ly  
bea r s  l i t t l e  l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  formal economic a n a l y s i s .  
To s t a t e  once more t h e  c e n t r a l  t h e s i s  of t h i s  paper: p o l i c y  ins t ruments  
a r e  n o t  s e l ec t ed  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e i r  formal p r o p e r t i e s ,  f o r  t h e s e  a l low a  
number of d i f f e r e n t ,  even c o n f l i c t i n g ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e a l i z a t i o n s .  Actual 
p o l i c i e s  a r e  determined i n  t h e  a r ena  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  choice,  no t  by a  s i n g l e ,  
well-defined d e c i s i o n  maker, bu t  by a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of p l aye r s  who c o n s t a n t l y  
a t tempt  t o  modify t h e  r u l e s  of t h e  game; t h e  synopt ic  model of choice misre- 
p r e sen t s  the bas i c  l o g i c  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
4. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FORMATION: THE CLOSED MODEL 
The p r i n c i p a l  c h a r a c t e r s  i n  a  closed model of t h e  policy-making process  
are:  l e g i s l a t o r s  and execut ives ,  governmental agencies ,  c i t i z e n s ,  i n t e r e s t  
group leaders ,  and p a r t y  l eade r s .  P o l i c i e s  a r e  shaped by barga in ing  and o t h e r  
forms of p a r t i s a n  mutual adjustment  among these  a c t o r s ,  w i t h i n  the  convent ions about  
ends and means , tha t ,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  con t ro l  t h e  behavior  of each p a r t i c i p a n t .  28 
p r i c e  system ( i . e .  both might so lve  t h e  same equat ions)";  s e e  Mil ton Friedman, 
11 Lerner On The Economics Of Control ,"  Jou rna l  Of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LV, October, 
1947, pp. 405-416. 
28 .  C. E .  Lindblom, The I n t e l l i g e n c e  Of Democracy, c i t . ,  ch. 6.  
I n  terms of t h i s  model, i t  i s  easy t o  s e e  why, i n  s p i t e  of t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
advantages of e f f l u e n t  charges  and equ iva l en t  methods of i n t e r n a l i z i n g  p o l l u t i o n  
cos t s ,  environmental l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  every country r e l i e s  p r imar i l y  on a  r egu la to ry  
approach, supplemented by generous amounts of s u b s i d i e s .  
The s t r e n g t h  of t h e  preference  f o r  regulat ion/enforcement  is revealed 
by r e c e n t  developments i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  For ins tance ,  t h e  1972 Water 
P o l l u t i o n  Cont ro l  Act ( t h e  so-cal led Muskie B i l l )  has  gone even f u r t h e r  than  
prev ious  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of r egu la t i on ,  s i n c e  i t  " e s s e n t i a l l y  ends 
t h e  use of water q u a l i t y  s tandards  a s  t h e  measuring rod f o r  performance and 
s u b s t i t u t e s  s tandards  o r  r e g u l a t i o n s  regard ing  e f f l u e n t  c o n t r o l  and t rea tment .  1129 
The same r egu la to ry  philosophy permeates t h e  1967 A i r  Qua l i t y  Act ( see ,  i n  p a r t i c -  
u l a r ,  i t s  T i t l e  11: Nat iona l  Emission Standards Act) ,  t h e  1972 Noise Control  
Act, and t h e  1974 Safe  Drinking Water Act. Perhaps even more i n d i c a t i v e ,  i s  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  a t tempts  by i n d i v i d u a l  l e g i s l a t o r s  t o  in t roduce  measures g iv ing  more 
emphasis t o  economic t o o l s ,  have m e t  with  no success ,  a t  l e a s t  s o  f a r .  The 
f a t e  of Senator  Proxmire's b i l l  e s t a b l i s h i n g  e f f l u e n t  charges  on i n d u s t r i a l  
p o l l u t e r s  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  ( t h e  "Penny a  pound" b i l l )  i s  symbolic. F i r s t  
submitted i n  November 1969, i t  had no t  y e t  been repor ted  ou t  of committee i n  
1973. The b i l l  has not  even been reintroduced i n  t h i s  Congress, and although 
Senator  Proxmire apparen t ly  t h inks  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some chance f o r  t he  i d e a  on 
a  s t a t e  b a s i s ,  he is n o t  pushing t h e  ma t t e r  i n  t h e  Senate .  A s  one of h i s  s t a f f  
members explained,  i t  is, apparen t ly ,  dead. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  Muskie B i l l ,  
-.--- -- ---- -. . .. . ." -... 
29. A. Myrick Freeman 111, and Robert H. Haveman, "Clean Rbetor ic  And 
D i r t y  Water," i n  A. C. Enthoven and A. M. Freeman, e d i t o r s ,  P o l l u t i o n ,  Re- 
sources ,  and The Environment, New York: W. W.  Norton and Co. Inc. ,  1972, 
p. 130. 
with i t s  s t rong  emphasis on e f f l u e n t  s tandards  and o the r  forms of r egu la t ion ,  
passed t h e  Senate by an 86-0 vote .  
I n  o the r  coun t r i e s ,  no tab ly  France and the  Netherlands, p o l l u t i o n  charges 
have been introduced i n t o  water  q u a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n .  B i i t  t h e  charge system, 
f a r  from becoming t h e  cornerstone of environmental po l i cy  t h a t  some observers  
had hoped, has  i n  f a c t  been used a s  p a r t  of a  machinery of d i r e c t  con t ro l s ;  
a  method f o r  spreading t h e  burden of expenditure  among p o l l u t e r s  i n  ways t h a t  
favor  t h e  major i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  (e.g.  through t h e  mechanism of t h e  f l a t -  
r a t e  schedule,  s e e  below), r a t h e r  than a  means of e f f i c i e n t l y  achieving given 
l e v e l s  of environmental q u a l i t y .  
Large i n d u s t r i a l  p o l l u t e r s  have s t renuous ly  objected t o  t h e  in t roduc t ion  
30 
of e f f l u e n t  charges; and when some form of p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  seemed unavoid- 
able ,  they have sys t ema t i ca l ly  favored t h e  use of s tandards ,  l i c e n s e s ,  and 
quotas .  3  1 
The somewhat paradoxical  preference  of p r i v a t e  i ndus t ry  f o r  government 
r egu la t ions ,  r a t h e r  than f o r  an impersonal and automatic system of taxes  t h a t  
would minimize i n t e r f e r e n c e  with t h e  normal opera t ions  of t h e  market, has  been 
_ l _ _ _ - l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . l . _  --.-. - 
30. See, f o r  ins tance ,  J. E .  Kinney, op. c i t . ,  and Harold C.  Lumb, 
"Fa l l ac i e s  Of A P o l l u t i o n  Tax," I n d u s t r i a l  Water Engineering, Apr i l  1971, 
pp. 15-18. 
31. On t h e  oppos i t ion  of German indus t ry  and of t h e  s t a t e s  (Laender) 
t o  a  proposed f e d e r a l  law t h a t  would in t roduce  e f f l u e n t  charges,  s ee  Renate 
Mayntz, External  Pressures  And Conf l i c t s  I n  The Formation And Implementation 
Of Environmental Pol icy ,  Berl in:  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  of Management, 1975. 
explained by Buchanan and ~ u l l o c k ~ ~  i n  terms of s p e c i f i c  advantages t h a t  in- 
d u s t r y  can d e r i v e  under t h e  l a t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  A s  t he se  au tho r s  show, under 
a  system of emission charges a  f i r m  n e c e s s a r i l y  i ncu r s  s h o r t  run  lo s se s ;  whether 
i t  remains i n  t h e  indus t ry ,  o r  s h i f t s  i t s  resources  t o  o t h e r  uses,  i t  w i l l  incur  
a  l o s s  i n  t he  p re sen t  va lue  of i t s  p o t e n t i a l  ea rn ings  stream. But under d i r e c t  
r e g u l a t i o n s  a s s ign ing  product ion quotas  t o  e x i s t i n g  f i rms ,  new p r o f i t s  may be 
p r e s e n t  even f o r  t h e  s h o r t  term, and a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  a r i s e  a f t e r  adjustment 
i n  p l a n t  capac i ty .  I n  f a c t ,  r e g u l a t i o n  may produce r e s u l t s  t h a t  a r e  s i m i l a r  
t o  those  of a  po l i cy  of c a r t e l i z a t i o n  or  of o l i g o p o l i s t i c  coo rd ina t ion .  
However, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n t e rven ing  i n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  process  may be 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y  more important  than the  d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s .  I n f i l t r a t i o n  of t h e  
machinery of economic r e g u l a t i o n  by s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  i s  a  r e c u r r e n t  theme i n  
t h e  burgeoning l i t e r a t u r e  on t h e  " c r i s i s  of t h e  r egu la to ry  commissions. '~ The 
same phenorneon can be observed, perhaps even more c l e a r l y ,  i n  t h e  environmental 
f i e l d .  A few examples w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  show t h i s .  I n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
" [ i l t  has been t h e  p r a c t i c e  i n  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
t o  g ive  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  were 
t h e  most s e r i o u s  p o l l u t e r s .  For many years ,  membership i n  s tandard 
s e t t i n g  boards i n  many of t h e  s t a t e s  was based on something of a  
t r i p a r t i t e  formula, w i th  i ndus t ry  having approximately one t h i r d  
of t h e  s e a t s  and wi th  t h e  publ ic ,  l abor  groups, and p r o f e s s i o n a l s  
w i th  s p e c i f i c  knowledge or  i n t e r e s t  i n  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  technology 
holding the  o the r  two t h i r d s .  Most of t h e  p ro fe s s iona l s  who were 
-- . . . .  . . - - - . -.- . .  . -. ._. _. _ _  . _ _ 
32. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tollock, " P o l l u t e r s '  P r o f i t s  And P o l i t i c a l  
Response: D i r e c t  Cont ro ls  Versus Taxes," The American Economic -.--- Review, March 
1975, pp. 139-147. 
l i k e l y  t o  be knowledgeable i n  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  mat te rs ,  how- 
ever ,  were e i t h e r  employed by i n d u s t r y  or were c l o s e l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
wi th  i ndus t ry ' s  p o i n t  of view. Consequently, many s t a t e s '  a i r  
p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  agenc ies  were f o r  a  long time indus t ry-pro tec t ion  
o r i en t ed ,  and would n o t  recommend a i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  measures 
t h a t  were c o s t l y  o r  o therwise  ob j ec t ionab le  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l l u t e r s  ..... 
Provis ions  t h a t  r e q u i r e  t h e  agency t o  s e t  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  
s tandards,  t ak ing  i n t o  account "economic f e a s i b i l i t y , "  were e s p e c i a l l y  
l i k e l y  t o  r e s u l t  i n  s t anda rds  t h a t  permit ted economic f a c t o r s  t o  
outweigh t h e  c la ims  of pub l i c  h e a l t h .  ,133 
A s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  holds  i n  t he  case  of water p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l :  
" I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  i n  water  p o l l u t i o n  s tandard s e t t i n g  agencies ,  
j u s t  a s  i n  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  s tandard s e t t i n g  agencies ,  t h e  presence 
of i n d u s t r y  board members has  hindered t h e  r egu la to ry  e f f o r t  by 
a t  l e a s t  a s  much a s  it has  advanced it .... The presence of c e r t a i n  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic pressure  i s  c l e a r l y  v i s i b l e  on the  f a c e  
of c e r t a i n  of t h e  water p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  s t a t u t e s .  Thus, f o r  
example, Pennsylvania makes i t s  a c t  app l i cab l e  only t o  sewage 
and exempts from coverage a l l  wastes  from coa l  mines, tannery 
and municipal sewage systems e x i s t i n g  a t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  a c t  was 
passed. 1134 
33. Frank P  . Grad, "Intergovernmental Aspects Of Environmental Controls" 
i n  Richard M.,,Laska and John Gerba, e d i t o r s ,  Managing The Environment, Washington, 
D.C.: U. S. ~ n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  Agency, 1973, p. 329. 
34. Ib id .  p. 332. 
I n  France, the  i dea  of "concerted management" ( admin i s t r a t i on  concertEe) ,  
a l ready  made f a m i l i a r  by t h e  p r a c t i c e  of t h e  Nat iona l  Planning Comiss ion ,  found 
sys temat ic  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  bas i c  1964 law on water  management and p o l l u t i o n  
c o n t r o l  (law no. 64-1245, i n  Jou rna l  O f f i c i e l  of December 18, 1964): a t  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  through t h e  Nat ional  Water Commission (Cornit6 Nat iona l  de  l lEau ,  
a r t .  15) ,  a t  t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l  through t h e  Basin  omm missions (Comit6s de Bassin,  
a r t .  13) and t h e  Basin Agencies (Agences F inanc ie res  de Bassin,  a r t .  14) . 3 5 
The Nat ional  Water Commission has  advisory func t ions .  Its s i x t y  members, 
who a r e  appointed by t h e  prime min i s t e r  f o r  s i x  years ,  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  users ,  t h e  
S t a t e ,  and t h e  e lec ted  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s ,  on an equal  b a s i s .  I n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  
a r e  s t rong ly  represented i n  t h e  f i r s t  group: ou t  of t h e  twenty s e a t s  a t t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  users ,  seven have been assigned t o  i ndus t ry  (but  only t h r e e  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  
two t o  p r i v a t e  consumers, two t o  i n t e r n a l  nav iga t ion ,  one t o  tourism, e t c . ) .  
The s i t u a t i o n  is  even more favorab le  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  bas in  
commissions, which a r e  p r imar i l y  advisory bod i e s ,  bu t  whose approval  i s  r equ i r ed  
t o  f i x  t h e  b a s i s  of c a l c u l a t i o n ,  and t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  e f f l u e n t  charges  proposed 
- 
by t h e  bas in  agencies .  The c a t e g o r i e s  of u se r s  represented i n  t h e  commissions, 
and t h e  number of s e a t s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  each category,  vary somewhat from b a s i n  t o  
I 
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35. The law n e i t h e r  f i x e s  t h e  number of ba s in s ,  nor  g ives  c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e i r  
d e f i n i t i o n ;  it simply in t roduces  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of p a r t i t i o n i n g  t h e  country i n t o  
a  number of j u r i s d i c t i o n s  i nc lud ing  one o r  more r i v e r  ba s in s .  A (p rov i s iona l )  
p a r t i t i o n  i n t o  s i x  r i v e r  ba s in s  (Artoy-Picardie,  Seine-Normandie, Loire-Bretagne, 
Adour-Garonne, ~h6ne-~editerran6e-~orse, Rhin-Meuse) has been introduced,  n o t  
without  con t rove r s i e s ,  by a  decree  of 1965 and a "Ci r cu l a i r e  du Premier min is t re"  
of 1966. 
bas in .  But, i n  any case ,  " [ t l h e  i n t e r e s t s  connected wi th  indus t ry ,  broadly 
in t e rp re t ed ,  c a r r y  cons iderable  weight i n  a l l  t h e  commissions, approaching o r  
exceeding t h e  ha l f  of t h e  use r s  r ep re sen ta t ion .  This  i s  i n  p e r f e c t  agreement 
with t h e  log ic  of t h e  law of 1964, s i n c e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  have t h e  primary res -  
p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  po l lu t ion ,  and a r e  t he  ones most a f f ec t ed  by the  charges.  1136 
Because e f f l u e n t  charges cannot be s e t  without approval of t h e  bas in  commissions, 
t h e  smaller  r ep re sen ta t ion  given t o  i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t he  bas in  agencies  
(of t h e  s i x t e e n  members of t h e  execut ive  board, e i g h t  come from t h e  n a t i o n a l  
adminis t ra t ion ;  t he  remaining ha l f  of t h e  s e a t s  i s  divided between l o c a l  ad- 
m i n i s t r a t o r s  and d i f f e r e n t  groups of u se r s ) ,  does not  change t h e  genera l  im- 
p r e s s ion  of favorable  t reatment  given by the  law t o  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l l u t e r s .  
One can only specula te  about t h e  r o l e  played by d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t  groups 
i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  s i x  r i v e r  bas ins  i n t o  which France has been subdivided. 
This  p a r t i t i o n  of t h e  country i n t o  a  few l a rge  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  only i n  p a r t  d i c t a t e d  
by cons idera t ions  of orography and watersheds, has  been viewed by some a s  a  way of 
d i l u t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  of popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  and a s  a  t echnoc ra t i c  encroach- 
ment on the  autonomies of l o c a l  communities. Cer ta in ly ,  manipulation of j u r i s -  
d i c t i o n a l  boundaries can be an e f f e c t i v e  method f o r  b lun t ing  the  t h r u s t  of t h e  
37 
most s t r i n g e n t  measures of p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l .  Thus, according t o  Grad , i n  t h e  
United S ta t e s ,  
" there  a r e  even a  number of i n s t ances  on record when inven t ive  
owners of manufacturing es tab l i shments  combined t o  incorpora te  
- - -.- 
36. Alain Fenet, "L1Administration De L 'Eau En France, " Revue Administra- 
t i v e ,  26, July/August 1973, pp. 384-396. 
-
37. F. P. Grad, "Intergovernmental Aspects Of Environmental Control," 
c i t . ,  p. 341. 
i n d u s t r i a l  enc laves  a s  c i t i e s  o r  v i l l a g e s ,  a s  a  defens ive  measure 
aga ins t  t h e  impos i t ion  of p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l s .  Thus a  h igh ly  in- 
d u s t r i a l  a r e a  with a  day time working popula t ion  of s e v e r a l  thousand 
persons and a  n i g h t  time popula t ion  l imi ted  t o  a  few watchmen may 
e f f e c t i v e l y  e l imina t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of having environmental pol lu-  
t i o n  c o n t r o l s  enforced aga ins t  them." 
But i t  would be a  mistake,  o r  an i n d i c a t i o n  of i d e a l o g i c a l  b i a s ,  t o  
assume t h a t  only i n d u s t r y  at tempts  t o  modify t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework i n  
i t s  own i n t e r e s t .  C i t i z e n  groups have long r ea l i zed  t h a t  r egu la to ry  pro- 
cedures  can be r e s t r u c t u r e d  i n  ways t h a t  reward t h e  resources  wi th  which they  
a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  wel l  endowed (votes  and o t h e r  means of p o l i t i c a l  in f luence ,  
s p e c i a l  connect ions wi th  opinion-£ orming media, e t c  .) . The process  develops 
along a  f a i r l y  r e g u l a r  p a t t e r n .  P re s su re s  a r e  exer ted  t o  secure  t h e  r i g h t  
of pub l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  environmental d e c i s i o n  making. Once the  r i g h t  i s  
granted,  group l eade r s  s t a r t  demanding "real1', r a t h e r  than  token, p a r t i c i p a -  
t i on .  This  i s  then i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  implying involvement i n  t h e  r egu la to ry  
process  a t  t h e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  s t age ,  s u i t a b l e  procedural  and o rgan iza t iona l  
changes, a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t e chn ica l  information and e x p e r t i s e  and, f i n a l l y ,  
p u b l i c  f i nanc ing  of p a r t i c i p a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s .  
A s  an example of t h e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  have been achieved i n  t h i s  way, con- 
s i d e r  t h e  1972 Federal  Water P o l l u t i o n  Control Act. Sec t ion  101(e) of t h i s  
Act, a s  amended, r e q u i r e s  t h e  Adminis t ra tor  of t h e  Environmental P r o t e c t i o n  
Agency, i n  coopera t ion  wi th  t h e  s t a t e s ,  t o  develop and pub l i sh  r egu la t i ons  
spec i fy ing  minimum gu ide l ines  f o r  pub l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  and a s s i s t  pub l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  development, r ev i s ion ,  and enforcement of any r egu la t i on ,  
s tandard,  e f f l u e n t  l i m i t a t i o n ,  plan o r  program e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  Adminis t ra tor  
o r  by any s t a t e  under t h e  Act. Responding t o  sugges t ions  made by c i t i z e n  groups, 
t h e  proposed r egu la t i ons  have been s t rengthened t o  t h e  p o i n t  of i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
a  Regional Adminis t ra tor  may r e j e c t  a  p lan  o r  g r a n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  i f  he f i n d s  
" inadequate  p a r t i c i p a t i o n . "  
Under t h e  r egu la t i on ,  each agency must make a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p u b l i c  r e f e r ence  
water  q u a l i t y  r e p o r t s  and o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  da ta ,  such a s  g ran t  and permit  appl ica-  
t i o n s ,  permits ,  e f f l u e n t  d i scharge  information,  and compliance schedule  r e p o r t s .  
Pub l i c  e f f o r t  i n  r e p o r t i n g  v i o l a t i o n s  of water  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  laws i s  a l s o  
encouraged. An e x p l i c i t  "Summary of Pub l i c  P a r t i c i p a t i o n , "  t o  be reviewed and 
evaluated by t h e  Adminis t ra tor  of E.P.A., by r eg iona l  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ,  o r  by o t h e r  
approving o f f i c i a l s ,  must be submitted (a )  i n  t he  c a s e  of r e g u l a t i o n s  and s tan-  
da rds  requi red  t o  be published by the  Adminis t ra tor  i n  t he  Federa l  Regis te r  o r  
requi red  t o  be publ ished by a  S t a t e  agency i n  an o f f i c i a l  form; (b) i n  t h e  c a s e  
of s t a t ewide  o r  areawide p lans ;  and (c) i n  t he  ca se  of a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  g r a n t s  
f o r  cons t ruc t ion  p r o j e c t s .  
The 1972 Act a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  pub l i c  hear ings  be held p r i o r  t o  t h e  
es tab l i shment  of any e f f l u e n t  l i m i t a t i o n  s tandards .  Publ ic  hear ings  a r e  no t  
t h e  on ly  form of pub l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  envisaged i n  t h e  Act.  Advisory boards 
and workshops a r e  o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  mechanisms. The i r  c o s t s  a r e  t r e a t e d  as 
a l lowable  expense under f e d e r a l  cons t ruc t ion  and p lanning  g ran t  r e g u l a t i o n s .  
For ins tance ,  75% of t h e  c o s t  of a  workshop connected wi th  a  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t  
'can be covered by t h e  Federa l  Government. 
The advantages t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  and admin i s t r a to r s  can der ive  from t h e  
r e g u l a t o r y  approach have been o f t e n  pointed ou t  by c r i t i c s  of p r e sen t  en- 
vironmental p o l i c i e s .  Economic i n t e r e s t s  can be favored through s u b s i d i e s  
hidden i n  tax d e p r e c i a t i o n  formulas o r  municipal cost-shar ing programs, and 
through t h e  g ran t ing  o r  withholding of d i scharge  l i c e n s e s .  The l e g a l  and ad- 
m i n i s t r a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  t h e  rule-making process  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  s h i f t -  
i n g  of t h e  r e a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  problems from t h e  f e d e r a l  t o  t he  s t a t e  l e v e l ,  and 
from l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  bu reauc ra t i c  agencies .  Thus, f i n a l  r e s o l u t i o n s  of t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s  a r e  avoided i n  favor  of piecemeal fragmented d e c i s i o n s  
t h a t  minimize t h e  chances of a l i e n a t i n g  powerful s e c t i o n s  of t h e  p o l i c y  maker's 
cons t i tuency .  
This  i s  a f a i r  d e s c r i p t i o n  of environmental p o l i t i c s ,  bu t  t h e  economist ' s  
cu re  does no t  l o g i c a l l y  fol low from t h e  d i agnos i s .  I t  has been s a i d  t h a t  
" [ f ]  rom t h i s  perspec t ive ,  i t  is l i t t l e  wonder t h a t  t h e  economist ' s  
p r e s c r i p t i o n  of r e s i d u a l s  charges has  generated modest p o l i t i c a l  
appeal .  I t  goes aga ins t  a l l  of t he se  tendenc ies ,  Establ ishment  
of a charge system i n  conjunct ion with environmental q u a l i t y  s tan-  
dards  would r e so lve  most of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  over t h e  en- 
vironment i n  a h igh ly  v i s i b l e  way where those  who would be h u r t  
by such a po l i cy  could s ee  what was happening ... I t  may no t  be 
f a c e t i o u s  t o  suggest  t h a t  t h e  reason r e s i d u a l s  charges have n o t  
been e f f e c t i v e l y  t r i e d  i n  t h i s  country i s  t h a t  they would work. 1'38 
They would work, i t  should be added, i n  a p o l i t i c a l  system t h a t  i s  
r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  one we know. A s  t h e  same au thors  r e a l i z e ,  a 
" s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  upheaval'' would be probably required f o r  acceptance 
of t h e  "massive t r a n s f e r  of p roper ty  r i g h t s "  e n t a i l e d  by a system of charges .  
.Short  of such r a d i c a l  changes, a long  d i r e c t i o n s  t h a t  have never  been c l e a r l y  
s p e l l e d  ou t ,  e f f l u e n t  charges  can be expected t o  be sub jec t  t o  p re s su re s  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  manipulat ions n o t  d i s s i m i l a r  from those  t h a t  have been shown 
t o  ope ra t e  i n  t h e  r egu la to ry  process .  
. - -. .. . - .... 
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5. CONCLUSIONS: THE INEVITABILITY OF BARGAINING 
From t h e  viewpoint of t h e  paradigm p r e v a i l i n g  i n  contemporary economics, 
t h e  h i s t o r y  of s o c i a l  p rogress  could be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  gradua l  t r a n s i t i o n  
from modes of excha.nge cha rac t e r i zed  by i s o l a t e d  bargaining,  through compet i t ive  
bargaining,  t o  t h e  p e r f e c t l y  competi t ive market, where t h e  exac t  terms on which 
exchange takes  p l ace  can be unambiguously determined. Competition assumes e t h i c a l  
overtones,  being " [ t l h e  main curb on a person ' s  barga in ing  power, and t h e  main 
pac i fy ing  in£  luence on t r a d e  i n  genera l .  1'39 
This  out look has  c e r t a i n l y  inf luenced t h e  t h ink ing  of many economists 
working i n  t h e  f i e l d  of p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l .  A s  we have seen, t h e  preference  
accorded t o  e f f l u e n t  charges  i s  j u s t i f i e d  a l s o  by t h e i r  a l leged  a b i l i t y  t o  re-  
duce barga in ing  and p o l i t i c a l  compromise. Conversely,  regulat ion/enforcement  
i s  r e j e c t e d  because i t  "becomes e s s e n t i a l l y  a p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  e n t a i l i n g  
barga in ing  between p a r t i e s  of unequal power": barga in ing  over t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  
t o  be s e t ,  over whether v i o l a t i o n s  have occurred, over r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and the  
s t e p s  t h a t  should be taken t o  c o r r e c t  i n f r a c t i o n s .  And because barga in ing  i s  
recognized a s  an e s s e n t i a l  component of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess ,  i t  i s  a s h o r t  
s t e p  t o  doubt t h e  a b i l i t y  of a p l u r a l i s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  system t o  make wise choices  
i n  environmental i s s u e s .  
I would argue t h a t  t h e  na ive  f a i t h  i n  t h e  f a i l - s a f e  p r o p e r t i e s  of c e r t a i n  
p o l i c y  instruments ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  r e luc t ance  t o  accept  barga in ing  a s  a method 
of p o l i c y  making, can  be t raced back t o  t he ,  perhaps unconscious, adopt ion of 
an open model of t h e  p o l i c y  process ,  i n  which p o l i t i c a l  dec i s ions  a r e  "handed 
39. Tibor  Sci tovsky,  Welfare And Competition, London: Unwin Univers i ty  
Books, 1952, p. 14. 
down from on high by omniscient beings who cannot e r r .  "40 I n  s p i t e  of a l l  
t h e  exorcisms, barga in ing  remains t h e  only known way of gene ra t i ng  v i a b l e  
p o l i c i e s  ou t  of a  we l t e r  of c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s ,  i l l - t e s t e d  t h e o r i e s  and 
d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  resources .  
I f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  l l [ t ] h e  most formidable b a r r i e r  t o  c o n t r o l l i n g  p o l l u t i o n  
i s  probably no t  technology, populat ion,  o r  pub l i c  a t t i t u d e s ,  bu t  t he  p o l i t i c s  
of power"41, i t  seems r a t h e r  p o i n t l e s s  t o  advocate p o l i c i e s  t h a t  b a s i c a l l y  deny 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  of environmental problems. In s t ead ,  more a t t e n t i o n  
should be given t o  d i f f e r e n t  ways of ach iev ing  a l t e r n a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of 
ba rga in ing  power t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  po l i cy  process .  One 
such method, incorporated i n  t h e  U.S. Nat ional  Environmental P o l i c y  Act, con- 
sists i n  empowering any c i t i z e n  o r  p r i v a t e  organiza t ion  t o  sue any p r i v a t e  o r  
pub l i c  body f o r  t h e i r  environmental ly  harmful ac t i ons ,  and p e r m i t t i n g  s u i t s  
a g a i n s t  pub l i c  o f f i c i a l s  f o r  no t  c a r r y i n g  out  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h i s  
connection. Another p o s s i b i l i t y  is  c l a s s  a c t i o n  i n  cou r t s ;  when ind iv idua l s  
o r  o rgan iza t ions  can  sue on behalf  of l a r g e  numbers of s i m i l a r l y  a f f e c t e d  
c i t i z e n s ,  t h e  bene f i t - cos t  terms of us ing  t h e  c o u r t s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r e d  
i n  favor  of t he  damaged p a r t i e s .  The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h i s  s t r a t e g y  has  been 
demonstrated by t h e  experience of C i v i l  Rights  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
and i s  i nc reas ing ly  recognized i n  o t h e r  coun t r i e s .  Thus, t h e  German Council 
of Exper t s  on Environmental Problems, i n  i t s  1974 Report, has  recommended l e g i s -  
l a t i o n  al lowing t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of c l a s s  a c t i o n  (Verbandsklage) f o r  environ- 
40. J. M. Buchanan, "Toward Analysis  Of Closed Behavioral Systems," 
c i t . ,  .p.  12. 
41. A. M. Freeman, R. H .  Haveman, A .  V. Kneese, The Economics Of En- 
vironmental  Pol icy ,  c i t . ,  p. 170 
mental o rgan iza t ions .  A b i l l  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  has been introduced by the  l i b e r a l  
p a r t y  of t he  Landtag i n  Baden-Wuertenberg. 
Major r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of bargaining power can be achieved through pub l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  pol icy  making. Here, indeed, i s  a  f i e l d  where c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  
of t he  b e n e f i t s a n d  c o s t s  of d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements could pay sub- 
42 
s t a n t i a l  dividends.  S u f f i c i e n t  empir ica l  ma te r i a l  i s  now a v a i l a b l e  t o  permit 
t e s t i n g  of d i f f e r e n t  hypotheses.  A r e l a t e d  i s s u e  i s  t h a t  of t h e  b e s t  form of 
r ep re sen ta t ion  of d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s  i n  bodies charged wi th  environmental 
management r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  For ins tance ,  t o  what e x t e n t  should representa-  
t i o n  depend on f i n a n c i a l  cont r ibu t ion ,  and how should o t h e r  types of contr ibu-  
t i o n  be valued? Comparative s t u d i e s  i n  t h i s  a r ea  would be h ighly  i n s t r u c t i v e .  
More important ly,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  comparisons of environmental p o l i c i e s  wot~ld 
he lp  t o  d i s p e l  b e l i e f s  t h a t  a r e  sometimes unquest ioningly accepted, even i n  
t h e  t echn ica l  l i t e r a t u r e .  Is i t  r e a l l y  t h e  " i n t e l l i g e n c e  of democracy1' t h a t  
is  f a i l i n g  i n  t he  environmental f i e l d ,  when pol icy  developments i n  a  country 
l i k e  t h e  Sovie t  Union repea t  a  sad ly  f a m i l i a r  t a l e  of be la ted  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
poorly enforced s tandards ,  c ross -cu t t ing  admin i s t r a t i ve  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
and behind-the-scene p re s su res  from (government-owned) indus t ry?  4 3 
42. See, f o r  ins tance ,  S t .  Ebbin and R .  Kasper, C i t i zen  Groups And The 
Nuclear Power Controversy, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press ,  1974. 
43. C. H.  Enloe, The P o l i t i c s  Of P o l l u t i o n  I n  A comparative Perspec t ive .  
New York: David McKay Co., 1975; P. R. Pryde, Conservation I n  The Sovie t  Union, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univers i ty  Press ,  1972; Ivan Volgyes, e d i t o r ,  Environmental 
De te r io ra t ion  I n  The Sovie t  Union And Eas te rn  Europe, New York: Praeger  Pub- 
l i s h e r s ,  1974. 
Could anybody f a m i l i a r  wi th  European experience i n  water  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  
accept  a s  a  f a c t  needing no proof t h a t  a  system of e f f l u e n t  charges  "would 
r e so lve  most of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  over t he  environment," l e av ing  " l i t t l e  
room fo r  admin i s t r a t i ve  d i s c r e t i o n  and bargaining"? We have seen  t h a t  under 
t h e  French system, t h e  base and r a t e  of t h e  charges a r e  f ixed  through negot ia-  
t i o n  between t h e  bas in  agency and the  bas in  commission, wi th  i t s  s t r o n g  re -  
p r e sen t a t i on  of s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .  Moreover, t h e  charges  a r e  n o t  even d i r e c t l y  
connected wi th  t he  amount of p o l l u t i o n  discharged,  be ing  c a l c u l a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  
of f l a t - r a t e  schedules ,  by type of i ndus t ry ,  drawn up i n  conjunc t ion  wi th  t h e  
u se r s .  This  arrangement i s  c l e a r l y  favorab le  t o  t h e  p o l l u t e r s :  even though 
-
a  f i r m  o b j e c t i n g  t o  t h e  f l a t - r a t e ,  can r eques t  t h a t  t h e  amount of p o l l u t i o n  
discharged be measured, very few have done so .  I n  t he  Seine-Normandy bas in ,  
f o r  ins tance ,  l e s s  than 1% have asked t h a t  t h e i r  a c t u a l  d i s cha rges  be measured. 44 
Far from a t tempt ing  t o  minimize admin i s t r a t i ve  d i s c r e t i o n  and barga in ing  
and t o  pursue c o n s i s t e n t l y  t h e  goal  of i n t eg ra t ed  water  management, t he  "re- 
~ o l u t i o n a r ~ " ~ ~  French law of  1964, i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  bas in  agenc ies ,  c a r e f u l l y  
avoided any competi t ion wi th  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of p r e e x i s t i n g  admin i s t r a t i ve  
bodies  and wi th  p r i v a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  add i t i on  t o  t h e i r  primary f i n a n c i a l  
f unc t ions ,  t h e  agencies  c a r r y  ou t  r e sea rch  and a c t  a s  consu l t an t s  i n  t he  p u b l i c  
i n t e r e s t .  But they can n e i t h e r  commission nor cons t ruc t  f a c i l i t i e s  such a s  
r e s e r v o i r s  and t rea tment  p l a n t s ;  even more s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  they have no re- 
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de sc r ibe  t h e  law. 
gula tory  power t o  e s t a b l i s h  o r  enforce  p o l l u t i o n  s tandards ,  t hese  func t ions  
being reserved t o  t h e  P r e f e t s .  
Having o f t e n  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  French experience a s  an important  source of 
counterexamples, i t  i s  perhaps appropr i a t e  t o  conclude t h i s  paper by quot ing i n  
f u l l  t h e  conclusions of a d e t a i l e d  s tudy of t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a spec t s  of im-. 
plementation of t h e  water p o l l u t i o n  law of 1964: 4 6 
"Being in sp i r ed  by an economic r a t i o n a l i t y  accepted by a l l  t h e  in- 
t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ,  t h e  a c t i o n  programs of t h e  agencies  have o f t e n  been 
considered capable of s t a r t i n g  a cha in  of s o l u t i o n s  acceptab le  t o  
everybody. I n  the  l i m i t ,  admin i s t r a t i ve  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  had only 
t o  a l i g n  themselves t o  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  worked out  by the  economist. 
This hope, l a r g e l y  shared a t  t h e  time of t h e  c r e a t i o n  of t h e  bas in  
s t r u c t u r e s ,  has been r ea l i zed  only very imperfec t ly .  I n  f a c t ,  even 
though a l a r g e  measure of agreement on genera l  d i r e c t i o n s  i s  always 
reached, r e s i s t a n c e s  and oppos i t ions  appear a s  soon a s  t h e  moment 
comes of d e r i v i n g  t h e  consequences, of making choices  and, e s p e c i a l l y ,  
o f ,paying  t h e  charges.  The l a t t e r  have been f ixed  a t  modest l eve l s ,  
w e l l  below the  threshold of economic r a t i o n a l i t y .  Nonetheless,  it 
has been necessary t o  g ran t  reduct ions  and f i n a n c i a l  a i d s  f o r  t he  
payments t o  be made by c e r t a i n  i n d u s t r i e s .  Thus, t h e  agencies  have 
not  r e a l l y  succeeded i n  r e g u l a t i n g  dec i s ions  and be.haviors. Even 
wi th  a progress ive  inc rease  of t h e  charge r a t e s ,  economic r a t i o n a l i t y  
cannot be t h e  miraculous s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i e l d  of water management: 
i t  overlooks t h e  r e s i d u a l  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  of any kind of human behavior .  
46. A. Fenet,  "LIAdministration De LIEau En ~ r a n c e , "  c i t . ,  p. 396. 
The legislators of 1964 knew this, for they anticipated an extension 
of administrative powers, and a reinforcement of prevention and re- 
pression mechanism." 
